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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Downplaying The Seriousness 
Of The Criminal Acts While Emphasizing The Seriousness Of Lying To The 
Police Was Unconstitutional Police Coercion 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it concluded that Valero's statements to 
Detective Bartlett were coerced. 1 Specifically, contrary to the district court's 
opinion, "convey[ing the] message" that lying to the police put Valero in a worse 
position than telling the truth was not constitutionally coercive and did not 
overbear Valero's will. (Appellant's brief, pp., 5-9.) In addition, the district court, 
although it stated the proper standard was the totality of the circumstances test, 
actually failed to consider the circumstances most relevant to the inquiry. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-14.) 
In response, Valero argues that this Court should distinguish "intrinsic" 
falsehoods from "extrinsic" falsehoods and hold that if the latter are present in 
the police interview any confession is automatically coerced. (Respondent's 
brief, pp. 16-20.) Valero's error of reducing the totality of the circumstances test 
to a single circumstance, rather than determining whether there was 
impermissible coercion that overbore the will of the defendant under the totality 
of the circumstances, is the exact error the district court made. 
1 It appears from the record that only Valero's statements made after the 
polygraph are suppressed in this case. (R., p. 56.) Evidence of Valero's 
admissions that he had touched the victim without sexual intent made before the 
polygraph examination and the alleged coercion is presumably admissible. 
(Exhibit A, Track 1.) 
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B. Detective Bartlett's Statements Were Not Constitutionally Coercive 
''The exclusionary rule applies to any confession that was the product of 
police coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was otherwise obtained 
by methods offensive to due process." Woodward v. State, 142 Idaho 98, 106, 
123 P.3d 1254, 1262 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). "'[C]oercive 
police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 
'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'" kL. at 106-07, 123 P.3d at 1262-63 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 
479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)) (brackets original). Review of the record shows no 
unconstitutional police coercion. 
Watching the recording of the interview shows it was not coercive. 
(State's Exhibit A.) Valero and Detective Bartlett are in an office; the interview is 
relatively short and a large part of it involves explanations of the polygraph 
process; Miranda rights are given and acknowledged as understood; and there is 
no yelling or physical intimidation. (ld.) Valero is not in custody, nor has he 
been deprived of food, clothing, water, contact with the outside world, or any 
other need or want. (ld.) Valero has no characteristics that would indicate he is 
particularly or especially vulnerable to the pressures of a police interview. (Id.; 
see also R., pp. 53-54.) 
During his interview of Valero, Detective Bartlett developed several 
themes. First, he developed the theme that the truth could be ascertained by the 
polygraph, and that such would also establish guilt or innocence in court. 
(Exhibit A, Track 1, 8:20-9:35 (polygraphs admissible in court); 20:58-21 :58; 
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Track 3, 7:45-8:12; 9:02-10:45 (knows and can say in court that Valero touched 
victim's breast).) Second, he developed the theme that in the grand universe of 
sex or other crimes, touching a teenager's breasts is relatively minor. (Exhibit A, 
Track 1, 11 :13-13:43 (compared with rape and murder); 18:59-19:50; 21 :58-
23:12 (compared with prostitution and rape); 40:30-41 :37 (allegations "minor on 
minor scale"); Track 3, 8:12-9:02.) Finally, Detective Bartlett developed the 
theme that lying about a relatively minor sex offense would make the situation 
worse while admitting what was done would make it better. (Exhibit A, Track 1, 
13:43-18:12 (story about how child who lies to a parent regarding damage to a 
car only makes situation worse); 19:58-21 :58 (court system looks at person who 
lies less favorably than one who "wants to make it right"); 21 :58-23: 12; Track 3, 
8:12-9:02,10:10-11:45.) Detective Bartlett ultimately emphasized that because 
Valero had failed the polygraph Detective Bartlett knew and could testify that 
Valero had touched the victim's breasts, so telling the truth about the relatively 
minor touching would be to Valero's ultimate benefit because telling the truth 
would establish that Valero was not a significant risk of worse conduct and that 
he had merely succumbed to a moment of weakness. (Exhibit A, Track 3, 8: 12-
11 :57.) Application of the correct legal standards shows that Detective Bartlett's 
use of these themes to persuade Valero to admit his conduct was not 
unconstitutionally coercive. 
In State v. Cordova, 137 Idaho 635, 51 P.3d 449 (Ct. App. 2002), 
Cordova contended his confession to sexually touching his niece was coerced 
because one officer represented that he was an expert in detecting lies and that 
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the officers could tell the victim was telling the truth and Cordova was lying when 
he denied being guilty. 1.9.:. at 638, 51 P.3d at 452. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
concluded "the officers' techniques in this case were not coercive." 1.9.:. at 639, 51 
P .3d at 453. Likewise in Valero's interview, merely stating that the polygraph 
indicated his guilt so Valero should be truthful to benefit himself was not 
coercive. "The police are allowed to play on a suspect's ignorance, fears and 
anxieties so long as they do not magnify these emotionally charged matters to 
the point where a rational decision becomes impossible." State v. Tapp, 136 
Idaho 354,365,33 P.3d 828, 839 (Ct. App. 2001) (quotes and brackets omitted). 
Indeed, the kind of "customary police tactics" used by Detective Bartlett does not 
"constitute such gross intimidation or coercion so as to overcome a defendant's 
free will and render his statements inadmissible." United States v. Cardenas, 
410 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir., 2005) (telling suspect that she had lied in first 
statement and only way to help herself thereafter was to cooperate was not 
coercive). 
This case has several parallels with that of Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329 
(8th Cir., 1993). Jenner was the mother of an infant found murdered in her home. 
She and her husband agreed to submit to polygraph tests, which showed 
deception by Jenner. For approximately the next five hours police interrogated 
Jenner using a variety of techniques, including telling Jenner she was a good 
mom and a good Christian, that there was a "bad Debbie [Jenner's first name]" 
who was responsible for the baby's death, accusing Jenner of not being truthful, 
using a raised voice, and asking what Jenner would think if her husband put all 
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the blame on her. kl at 331-32. The court found no coercive police actions, 
specifically stating that it "was not improper to inform Jenner that her polygraph 
test results indicated deception," or to claim disbelief of denials, use a raised 
voice, employ deception, and employ a sympathetic attitude. kl at 334. "There 
is nothing inherently wrong with efforts to create a favorable climate. for 
confession," the court stated; indeed, "very few people give incriminating 
statements in the absence of official action of some kind." kl (internal brackets, 
quotes and citations omitted). 
Here Detective Bartlett certainly did what he could to create a "favorable 
climate for confession." He indicated, at least somewhat deceptively, that the 
polygraph was sufficient to establish Valero's guilt. He minimized the 
seriousness of the crime in relation to other sex offenses. He told Valero that the 
only real issue left was whether Valero was a danger to society or a man who 
had merely made a mistake, and that Valero could best help himself on that 
score by being truthful about touching the victim's breast. Finally, Detective 
Bartlett was sympathetic to Valero and hypothesized that the touching happened 
only because the victim had initiated it, at which point Valero indicated that that 
was what had actually happened. None of these interview techniques were 
constitutionally coercive. 
Even Valero seems to acknowledge that, had Detective Bartlett strictly 
stayed within the themes set forth above, his actions would have been beyond 
constitutional challenge because everything he said was "intrinsic" to the crime 
he committed. (See Respondent's brief, pp. 16-17 ("Intrinsic" misrepresentations 
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not coercive, but "extrinsic" ones are). But Detective Bartlett, according to 
Valero's theory, converted an "intrinsic" statement into an "extrinsic" one when he 
uttered three words: "the crime of." (Respondent's brief, pp. 12 ("What is getting 
you to the end of the world and getting you in a bad spot now is the crime of lying 
to the police" (quoting Exhibit A, Track 3 (emphasis added), 16-17 ("by telling Mr. 
Valero that he could testify to 100% certainty that he committed the 'crime of 
lying to the police'-a more serious crime that the crimes for which he was being 
investigated" Detective Bartlett told an "extrinsic" falsehood that deprived Valero 
of the ability to make a rational choice).) Valero's argument is thus that the three 
words, "the crime of," converted an otherwise proper interview into 
unconstitutional coercion by threatening Valero with a prosecution for an 
additional crime unless he confessed. 
Valero has failed to show that by using the three words, "the crime of," 
Detective Bartlett coerced Valero into making incriminating statements. In 
context, use of the three words did not create a promise of lesser charges or a 
threat of greater charges based on whether Valero chose to continue denying or 
instead to admit the crime. Rather, Detective Bartlett's statements were merely 
that Valero would generally benefit himself by admitting his actions. See,~, 
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979) (telling a suspect that cooperation 
is to his benefit is "far from" coercive). The record therefore does not show any 
coercion by Detective Bartlett. The district court's contrary conclusion is 
reversible error. 
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C. Even If Detective Bartlett's Statements Could Be Deemed Coercive, The 
District Court Failed To Consider Any Other Circumstance And Therefore 
Failed To Apply The Totality Of The Circumstances Test 
A determination of whether a statement was voluntary is made from the 
"totality of the circumstances" including "the characteristics of the accused as 
well as the details of the interrogation, including whether Miranda warnings are 
given." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926,928,894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Suppression is only appropriate if "the defendant's will was overborne by police 
coercion when the confession was made." State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 364, 
33 P.3d 828, 838 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
285-86 (1991». 
Even if use of the three challenged words introduced some element of 
improper coercion in the interview, there is no evidence that it overbore Valero's 
will. Factors to consider in the totality of the circumstances test are whether 
Miranda warnings are given; the youth of the accused; the accused's education 
and intelligence; the length of detention; the repeated or prolonged nature of 
questioning; and deprivation of food or sleep. Woodward v. State, 142 Idaho 98, 
107, 123 P.3d 1254, 1263 (Ct. App. 2005). As noted above, Valero was given 
and understood his Miranda rights; he was an adult; he completed high school 
and had apparently average intelligence; he was free to leave and not detained; 
although not free of redundancy, he was not badgered or browbeaten in 
questioning; and he was not deprived of food, sleep or other essentials. None of 
these circumstances showing that the statements were not coerced, however, 
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was included in the district court's analysis. (R., pp. 56-58; see also 6/2/11 Tr., 
p. 3, L. 22 - p. 5, L. 22.) 
Rather than apply the correct legal standard of reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances, the court declared that it was "inclined to conclude that 
[Detective] Bartlett's tactic was sufficient to overbear Valero's will" based on a 
single factual finding. (R., p. 56.) That finding was that Detective Bartlett's 
statements "clearly conveyed the message that the accusations against Valero 
were minor in nature, that Bartlett, via the polygraph[,] had caught Valero lying 
about the minor accusations and could testify to that 100% in a court of law, and 
that the legal/penal consequences would be worse if he maintained the crime of 
lying to the police than if he admitted touching the breast." (R., p. 56 (emphasis 
added).) 
On appeal Valero does not dispute that the district court's April 15, 2011 
order did not look at the totality of the circumstances, but does argue that the 
district court did properly look at the totality of the circumstances at the June 2, 
2011 hearing. (Respondent's brief, pp. 19-20.2) At that hearing the district court 
stated that "the defendant maintained his denial" after being told he failed the 
2 Valero's counsel asserts that the state's argument that the district court failed to 
consider all the relevant circumstances is "either patently false or misguided" 
although he allows that undersigned counsel "did not purposefully attempt to 
mislead this Court." (Respondent's brief, p. 19 and n.6.) As will be addressed in 
detail above, the record shows that the district court's analysis, rather than look 
at the totality of the circumstances, stops with the determination that some 
statement or statements made by Detective Bartlett were coercive. It is telling 
that Valero's counsel has not articulated a single circumstance other than the 
alleged coercion considered by the district court. (Respondent's brief, pp. 19-
20.) 
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polygraph; made his admissions "after" Detective Bartlett told him he would be 
"in worse trouble for maintaining the untruthful denial" and concluded "Bartlett's 
representations were clearly linked to the defendant's willingness to talk, and 
that's what overbore the defendant's will. Bartlett's message was the defendant 
was going to be in big trouble unless he confessed." (6/2/11 Tr., 5, Ls. 4-16.) 
Based on this the district court elected to "stand[] by its earlier ruling" (6/2/11 Tr., 
p. 5, Ls. 17-22), which was "based on [the] finding" that a coercive tactic had 
been employed (R., p. 56). 
There is nothing in the transcript of the June 2, 2011 hearing that 
suggests the district court based its holding on anything other than a single 
circumstance-that the court had found the "message" that continued denial 
would put Valero in a worse position than an admission. The district court makes 
no mention of additional circumstances, and nothing indicates that they played 
any role whatsoever in the analysis. The court does not recognize in its analysis 
that Detective Bartlett was not threatening, did not raise his voice, or that the 
overall atmosphere was far from a police dominated. There is no discussion by 
the district court of the facts that Valero was not in custody and had been given 
and understood Miranda warnings, and therefore always had the options of 
silence, consulting with counsel, or even simply leaving the interview. Simply 
stated, the district court erroneously ended its analysis after concluding that 
there had been a coercive element to the interview and failed to consider the 
other circumstances as required by the applicable legal standard. 
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Valero's will was not overborne. The aspect of the interview ultimately 
found coercive was actually very small. It was not unconstitutionally coercive to 
tell Valero that, on the sliding scale of sex crimes, his offense was small; it was 
not unconstitutionally coercive to make statements leading to the impression that 
his guilt would be established in court by the polygraph; it was not improper 
coercion to inform Valero that the ultimate outcome of the case, and therefore 
the seriousness of the consequences, would depend in large part upon the view 
of Valero's character, including whether he lied to the police and whether there 
were extenuating circumstances. In fact, Valero maintained his innocence when 
he was told that lying to the police would make his situation worse and 
confessed only when told there were probably extenuating circumstances related 
to the conduct of the victim in initiating the contact. (State's Exhibit A, Track 3, at 
6:11-12:35.) To the extent that there was any message that lying to the police 
constituted a separate crime, that mention was short, passing, and did not result 
in any incriminating statements but instead in another denial. 
This, in combination with the circumstances that Valero could have ended 
the interview at any time by leaving, invoking his right to silence, or invoking his 
right to counsel, all rights Valero understood, shows that Valero's will was not 
overborne. 
Finally, Valero argues that the district court did not err by failing to 
consider the totality of the circumstances because "a single tactic" may render a 
confession involuntary, comparing this case to cases in which the police 
physically tortured a confession out of a prisoner or held the suspects for days 
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without contact with the outside world while subjecting them to constant 
interrogation. (Respondent's brief, p. 20 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 
278 (1936) (defendant repeatedly hung from tree by neck and whipped); 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (defendants held without process and 
questioned for five days).) While the state concedes that Miranda warnings 
would not preserve a confession beaten out of a prisoner, for example, the 
argument that the coercion in this case rises to the level that no other 
circumstances attending the making of the incriminating statements need be 
considered is specious. 
The district court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances. 
Although the district court stated it was looking at the "totality of the 
circumstances," its entire analysis is that because the detective had used a 
"forbidden tactic" in response to the "defendant's unwillingness to talk" the 
detective had "undermined the defendant's free will" and therefore "overbore the 
defendant's wilL" (6/2/11 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 4-22.) The district court, as does Valero 
on appeal, employed an analysis that ended with the determination of an 
improper tactic without any consideration whatsoever of any of the other 
circumstances surrounding the making of the incriminating statements. Because 
"forbidden tactics" are not used on persons who have already indicated a 
willingness to confess, the standard applied by the district court would result in 
suppression upon any finding of coercive tactics, regardless of any other factor. 
Such is not the applicable legal standard. 
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In this case Valero knew he had the option of leaving, remaining silent, or 
requesting an attorney at any time. He was not particularly or irregularly 
vulnerable to police tactics. The atmosphere of the interview was not police-
dominated, was relatively short, was not marked by any overt threats, promises, 
or deprivations, and was relatively cordial. In addition, the entirety of the 
coercion ultimately comes down to three words, allegedly converting a statement 
that Valero would help himself in relation to the defendant's accusations into a 
statement that he would avoid an additional charge. Given the relative lack of 
coercion in such a statement and in the context of all the other circumstances, 
the district court erred by suppressing Valero's statements. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order of suppression and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1st day of March, 201 
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